

South Africa–North Africa Relations: Bridging a Continent

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We have managed to arrive at and further enhance a shared political understanding of Africa and her place in the world. Through our meetings (Algeria–South Africa) we have expanded this relationship to cover a range of economic, social, scientific and cultural sectors that can build our countries and our people. As we meet here in Pretoria and as indeed when we met last year in Algiers, I believe we are ‘feeding the future with its ripeness’ and making of Africa all that is beautiful, true and new. In the creation of enabling conditions for African innovation, African splendour, African ownership, African interconnectedness in all possible ways, we are indeed taking this united road of many lanes, many languages, to recovery and sustained development.

Thabo Mbeki¹

There are few countries outside our immediate region of Southern and Eastern Africa that we have visited as often since our release from jail as the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahyria. Our frequent visits reflect our affection for the esteemed Brother Leader and the people of this great country. We shall never forget Libya’s material and moral support of our own struggle against racist apartheid rule. It remains in our memories and spurs us on to help lighten the plight of our Libyan brothers and sisters.

Nelson Mandela²

Introduction: Cape to Cairo

Cecil John Rhodes dreamed of a railway extending from Cape to Cairo. It was a romantic and revolutionary concept, running against the colonial tide. Building infrastructure to connect African countries

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was not on the priority list of those colonial countries once they had grabbed their piece of the continent. Their infrastructural investment went into building road and rail links from the original resource pools to the coast – the quicker to get the spoils to colonial metropolitan power and markets. Years later, with Africa now free,³ the concept of a bridge between the north and the south of the continent remains an ideal and, many would argue, still a rather distant dream. In these post-colonial times, when British Empire links have receded into history, the north–south bridge is something that is being more enthusiastically pursued by the Maghreb countries today, notably Algeria.

Building relations between democratic South Africa and North Africa has required a great deal of work to make up for the lack of contact in previous decades. The Sahara Desert has proved to be a major barrier to understanding and building friendship. In the apartheid era, South Africa had more in common with Europe and North America than it did with the northern or eastern sections of its own continent. Today, all the North African countries – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – have embassies in South Africa (including a representative office for Western Sahara) and South Africa has embassies operating in each of the five countries of the region as well as a trade office in Cairo. The African National Congress (ANC) government has drawn on its historical liberation experience for its relations with the countries concerned.⁴

For administrative purposes, the colonial powers divided Africa into north and sub-Saharan components. Regrettably, international organisations like the World Bank and the IMF continue to do this. African countries themselves tend to make the same distinction, prolonging the concept of a non-existent continental division. The proximity of North African countries to Europe has naturally led to their developing closer ties, particularly with the Mediterranean countries.

An examination of South Africa's post-apartheid relations with North Africa is best broken into the two presidencies of the ANC. In this paper, I examine the bilateral and multilateral relations democratic South Africa has developed with the North African region. Specifically I will look at how relations with Algeria have grown into a strategic partnership and how ties with Egypt and Libya have required courage, forbearance and tact of the highest order.

The Mandela era

Nelson Mandela led South Africa's move into the northern and other

regions of Africa. The approach was cautious and deliberately sensitive to any fears of arrogance or triumphalism. Mandela was very aware of the debt South Africa owed North African countries for their contribution to the liberation struggle.⁵ His choice of a low-key but well-connected foreign minister in Alfred Nzo epitomised a desire to engage Africa with humility and deference. He was aware that every continental and regional organisation, from the OAU downwards would not undergo changes simply by having South Africa join it.

His combination of pragmatism and idealism is best illustrated by relations with Libya.⁶ These were strongly criticised from within South Africa and earned the undisguised disapproval of the US and other Western powers which were at the forefront of tightening sanctions against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, a man who featured high on their list of so-called terrorist states. Mandela showed a penchant for irritating the US by remaining loyal to his own friends, many of whom were *personae non grata* in Washington. Chief among these was Gaddafi. Clearly both Mandela and President Thabo Mbeki have evolved distinct styles in dealing with the highly idiosyncratic approach of 'Brother Leader' (Gaddafi) to African and international relations.

Mandela's stubborn individualism paid off handsomely when, in co-operation with Saudi Arabia, he was able to use his offices to break the diplomatic logjam over the Lockerbie affair, which concerned two Libyan nationals charged with the 1988 bombing of an American airliner over Scotland that killed 270 people. Mandela appointed Jakes Gerwel to negotiate with Gaddafi over several months. Gerwel was assisted by the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan Abdul Aziz in spite of the fact that by getting involved in this matter, Saudi Arabia was risking its good relations with the US and Britain.

In January 1999, the South African–Saudi team eventually persuaded Gaddafi to hand over the two men, Abdul Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamin Khalifa Fahima, for trial before Scottish judges at The Hague. The deal agreed on and implemented was that the UN sanctions imposed on Libya in 1992 would be suspended immediately the suspects were delivered, and that these sanctions would be completely lifted within 90 days. Any imprisonment of the Libyans would be in a specially segregated section of an institution in Scotland, with special consideration given to their religious and cultural needs.⁷

Mandela's emphasis on human rights led him to keep Algeria at arm's length after the truncation of elections there in 1992, that fundamentalist parties appeared to be on the verge of winning. He

was less critical, however, of serious human rights excesses in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia as he developed relations with those countries. In this respect, he made state visits and private visits to the latter countries.

Of particular note was Mandela's state visit to Egypt in 1997, where he conferred on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak the Order of Good Hope and received the Collar of the Nile.⁸ Mbeki visited Cairo in 2000 to attend the Africa–EU Summit, in spite of the frosty diplomatic links between Cairo and Pretoria.

Mbeki's diplomacy: Building and managing links

Mbeki had a more confident approach to North Africa. The yardstick for developing relations was a more pragmatic measure of mutual economic benefit than Mandela had applied. Nevertheless, Mbeki decided that on this basis, the countries of North Africa warranted close and permanent attention from South Africa. Even before the September 11 terrorist attacks on Washington and New York raised sympathy for Algeria's struggle against the scourge, Mbeki had identified the emerging oil-rich democracy as a strategic partner.⁹ Mbeki stated that:

Clearly, despite the physical distance imposed upon us (South Africa–Algeria) by geography, the relationship between our two countries is an intimate one, going back many decades to the struggle of the African peoples for national liberation and freedom from colonial rule. In particular, we must thank President Bouteflika, at the time as the President of the General Assembly, for the important role he played in the decision to isolate the racist government of South Africa.¹⁰

Relations with Libya have been altogether more complicated with an apparent rivalry between Mbeki and Gaddafi for the soul of the new AU. The most useful analogy here to describe the different approaches of Mbeki and Mandela would be that of 'good cop, bad cop', with Mandela softening Gaddafi and leading him back into the international fold and Mbeki telling him some home truths about the consequences for Africa of his rhetorical outbursts and unpredictable behaviour.

In terms of Egypt, Mbeki's team has questioned the commitment of the country to African ideals. He has been irritated by Mubarak's insistence on being named as a key player in the African socio-

economic rescue plan, Nepad, but not attending meetings of the steering implementation committees.

Algeria and Morocco

Algeria played host to Nelson Mandela and gave refuge and training to many cadres such as Mzwewu Henry Ntsele and MK Veteran Johannes Moopeloa from the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress.¹¹ The military regime of Lamine Zeroual cashed in on this revolutionary link, with the faded picture of the fugitive Mandela and his Algerian guerrilla hosts becoming an icon. Algeria was an outspoken opponent of apartheid, playing an active role in the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid and as president of the General Assembly. That function was performed by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, then Algeria's foreign minister who, in 1974, presided over the suspension of apartheid South Africa from the assembly.

His erstwhile South African counterpart Pik Botha recalls that despite the acrimony and heat of debate over this unprecedented action, Bouteflika never treated him with anything but the greatest courtesy and civility. Bouteflika was one of the founding troika of African leaders, along with Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, on the Nepad steering committee. Morocco, by contrast, later developed military and other ties with the apartheid regime. Arms bought from South Africa were used in Morocco's bid to crush the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara, a territory that it has occupied since 1975 in defiance of the international community.

Given the history of South Africa and Algeria, it is no surprise that post-apartheid relations with the country have been conducted at presidential level. In fact the relationship has been developed to a strategic level that makes Algeria among South Africa's closest friends on the continent and indubitably the most important partner in the region. An excellent chemistry and deep historical bond exist between Bouteflika and Mbeki. South Africa has shared its experiences to help Algeria with internal political reconciliation, gender issues and economic development, in which it offered Algeria assistance in its bid to accede to the WTO.

The level of diplomatic representatives sent to Algiers by Mbeki further demonstrates the importance placed on bilateral relations. The current South African ambassador to Algeria, Siphso Moloï, was, prior to his current appointment, responsible for the Middle East focus in the newly-founded Presidential Advisory Unit.

The presidential commission meetings between these countries have involved Cabinet teams of unprecedented size relative to South Africa's dealings with other countries on the continent. However, at this stage, the level of bilateral business and investment does not justify the level of political involvement. The latter is motivated more by long-term bilateral and multilateral strategic goals than hard cash. Every effort is being made, however, to remedy this with South African businesses, which are being encouraged to build economic relations.

Early relations with Algeria demonstrated South Africa's naiveté in dealing with Muslim fundamentalism. Persuaded that he was dealing with a victim of Algerian repression, Mandela received the leader of the terrorist organisation, Group Islamique Armee (GIA).¹² Algeria responded by recalling its ambassador for consultation. The gaffe necessitated sending Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad as a special envoy to Algeria carrying Mandela's apology for the incident. The September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon have earned Algeria a greater level of understanding for the need for a gloves off approach in the fight against terrorism. Algeria, which lost more than 100,000 people to the scourge since 1992, has become the seat of the AU's centre against terrorism.

Morocco–Western Sahara challenge

Morocco has expended the bulk of its efforts in trying to ensure that South Africa did not join other African nations in recognising the government-in-exile of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).¹³

In 1994, King Hassan II managed to persuade Mandela to delay his written promise to recognise the SADR. At the time of the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara, the Polisario Front had developed strong fraternal ties at the UN with the ANC, South West Africa People's Organisation (Swapo) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretelin). To counter this solidarity, Hassan had to draw heavily on his influence with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gali, French President Francois Mitterrand and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Five years later Hassan's successor, Mohamed VI took similarly drastic action, applying intense diplomatic pressure at a time when Mbeki, who described the Western Sahara as being Africa's last colonial problem, was on the brink of recognising the SADR.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, French President Jacques

Chirac and the US administration were all called in by Morocco to press Mbeki to stay his hand. Mandela also intervened by asking Mbeki to delay the decision until after he had travelled to the kingdom to express his condolences on the death of Hassan – more than a year after the regent's death in 1999.

Early in 2004, the South African government sent a delegation to Western Sahara to assess possible direct health, and social development support. In September 2004, South Africa in a long overdue move, some 10 years after Mandela's written promise to the Western Sahara leadership, announced that South Africa would formally recognise the SADR. Morocco immediately recalled its ambassador for consultations. Mbeki, making reference to the issue at the opening session of the Pan African Parliament in Midrand, South Africa, on 16 September 2004, just prior to the recognition announcement said: 'It is a matter of great shame and regret to all of us that ... the issue of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara remains unresolved.'

The edge in bilateral relations with Morocco was revealed on the two occasions that the countries vied for the right to host the soccer World Cup. In the contest for the 2006 competition, Morocco shunned the African call to allow South Africa to make the bid for the continent in the final round.

However it was in the race for the 2010 bid, where an African winner was guaranteed, that Morocco took off the gloves. The state controlled media made repeated vituperative attacks on the social structure of South Africa, trying to promote a message that crime and the high incidence of HIV/Aids made it too dangerous a venue for the world's most prestigious sporting contest.

Libya: Diplomacy of accommodation

South Africa was ahead of the curve in its dealings with Libya. Long before the Western world had resumed political and economic relations with Libya, South Africa was questioning the wisdom of vilifying and isolating Gaddafi. Indeed it could be argued that South Africa played a key role in Gaddafi's 'rehabilitation'. With UN sanctions still in force, Mandela visited Tripoli and Sirte to negotiate the Lockerbie deal. Mandela repeatedly defended his relations with Gaddafi, saying that neither the US nor any other power had the right to choose South Africa's friends.

However, this political relationship has not translated into

significant economic ties. A South African business delegation, led by then Minerals and Energy Affairs Minister Penuell Maduna, visited Sirte in 1999. It found that European business had jumped the gun on sanctions and grabbed the most important projects in a country effectively rebuilding itself after more than a decade of isolation. Gaddafi has shown himself to be extremely pragmatic in his business dealings, prioritising the bottom line above political ties.

Relations between Mbeki and Gaddafi have been characterised by a struggle for the soul of the AU. Gaddafi was acknowledged as the father of the process of transforming the OAU into the AU, which was agreed at the special summit in Sirte. He tried to have the inaugural summit of the new body moved to Libya from South Africa. When he was unsuccessful, he upstaged Mbeki whenever possible during this landmark occasion held in Durban. One such tactic was to persistently make impractical proposals for the organisation to take up, including a single army, parliament and bank. Although these have not been implemented, his notions have been indulged by African leaders, including Mbeki, as have his spontaneous outbursts on AU platforms against his perceived enemies.

Increasingly, South Africa and many other states are trying to shift Libya away from its counterproductive cheque book diplomacy.¹⁴ As inaugural president of the AU, Mbeki attempted to accommodate Gaddafi by agreeing to another special summit in Sirte to discuss the latter's elaborate plans for the organisation. In fact, much of the bilateral energy generated between Libya and South Africa has been expended on managing a difficult relationship. But Gaddafi has shown less of an appetite for Africa of late. He missed the latest AU summit in Addis Ababa in 2004, saying he had put the African train on its tracks and seen it move down the line. African leaders no longer needed his guidance, he said, but he nevertheless left his lofty plans for the organisation on the agenda.

Tunisia: Human rights and poverty alleviation

Relations with Tunisia got off to a good start with Mandela attending his first OAU summit in Tunis in 1994. President Ben Ali made a state visit to South Africa and addressed both houses of parliament. The ties, however, remain more symbolic than substantive.¹⁵ Ben Ali literally ordered Tunisian businesses to establish ties with their South African counterparts. The response from the South Africans was disappointing.

A bi-national commission has been established between the two

countries which has met three times. Tunisia's human rights failings notwithstanding, South Africa has admired the poverty alleviation programmes and societal building projects of Ben Ali. In spite of allegations of Tunisia being an oppressive state, there is also an understanding by South Africa that this small country sandwiched precariously between robust Libya and troubled Algeria is forced to take extraordinary measures to guard against militancy and fundamentalism crossing the border. As the host to more than four million European tourists annually, Tunisia has to safeguard its security. Having police on virtually all trains and buses might normally be considered the sign of a police state. In Tunisia's case it indicates an over-cautious administration, protecting its most lucrative income source.

Ben Ali has adopted an avowedly secular approach that is also worth exploring in this complex region.

During Mbeki's official state visit there in 1995 as Deputy President he volunteered for South Africa to host the second Afro-Arab Trade fair, a project supported by the AU. Recently, the head of the AU, Alpha Konare, called for 'closer links between African and Arab markets to create a larger economic space within the framework of South–South co-operation'.¹⁶

Mbeki's October 2004 state visit to Tunisia has helped to build on the ANC's historic friendship with Tunisia. The late ANC President Oliver Tambo, Mbeki's mentor, was issued a Tunisian passport when denied one by apartheid South Africa. The focus of ties between the two countries is on health and cultural co-operation. South Africa and Tunisia also have similar interests in peacekeeping initiatives in the DRC and Burundi, where Tunisian and South African soldiers are stationed.

Egypt: Working with the regional giant

South Africa's relations with Africa's second most populous country, Egypt, are undoubtedly the most complex and competitive it has with any fellow African country. Egypt's status as an African country has been questioned at the highest level by most African presidents, including South Africa. Mubarak has not attended an African summit since an attempt was made to assassinate him in Addis Ababa in 1995. But he insisted on being part of the enlarged Nepad Steering Committee when it was extended by two members. He also insisted on being part of the AU's Nepad implementation group even though he has not attended its meetings.

However, he has attended summits of the group of eight of the world's most industrialised countries (G8) as part of specially invited African delegations. Significantly, he was not part of the African team at this year's G8 meeting on Sea Island off Georgia in the US. Mubarak, whose fourth, six-year term expires in October 2005, has not taken kindly to US pressure for democratisation and constitutional reform.

Egyptian representatives on the continent have reacted angrily to South African suggestions that they are Africans only when it suits them – such as in their bid for the 2010 soccer World Cup. They say their support for the majority of South Africans during the anti-apartheid struggle was beyond reproach and it ill behoves anyone now to question Egypt's credentials. Indeed, many South African cadres such as Commissar of the ANC's armed wing, MK and former ANC Durban North Regional Organiser, the late Joseph Nduli, were based in Cairo. South Africa's first democratic defence minister, the late Joe Modise, also set up ANC military bases in Egypt.¹⁷ There is also a binational commission between the two countries that meets regularly at ministerial level.

Much of the difficulty arises from Egypt's resentment at the multilateral role that South Africa has assumed and which has overshadowed Egypt as the continent's leader.¹⁸ Egypt and South Africa share similar views on the Palestinian question and other contentious international questions, such as nuclear disarmament. But at the end of the day, Egypt and South Africa are the rivals for the role of African leader in international matters. If and when reform of the UN Security Council produces a permanent African seat, Egypt would expect to get it ahead of South Africa. Egypt mounted a late bid against South Africa to host the African parliament in spite of the fact that it became common knowledge that Mbeki had been specifically requested by several of his African colleagues at the AU's 2002 Durban summit to host the parliament because of South Africa's exemplary record of democracy and the rule of law. Predictably, the Addis summit in 2004 agreed to site the parliament in South Africa, but Egypt had made its point in showing that it was a key player on decisions about continental issues.

The fact though that Mubarak is seriously considering making a long-awaited state visit to South Africa this year indicates that Egypt does want to build better relations with South Africa, which can only be for the good of the continent. The proposed visit seems to suggest that Egypt may be re-examining its foreign policy goals towards South Africa within the changing global context.

Conclusion: Promoting bilateral and multilateral development

Politically and administratively, the South African government has built the road linking Pretoria to North Africa's capitals. Mbeki and his foreign affairs officials have invested much political will in developing South Africa's critical links with that region as part of the larger strategic goal 'to participate in the titanic and protracted struggle to achieve Africa's renewal'.¹⁹ It is now up to the business and NGO community to make use of the highway to make greater contact with an important and coherent region of the Mediterranean basin linked to the Middle East and to Africa.

There are huge opportunities, particularly in Algeria and Libya, which have yet to be taken up. Thus far, only the more adventurous mining houses and larger corporations, in the petro-chemical and construction fields, have even explored them.

There are logistical problems for people wanting to travel between the north and south of the continent. Direct air links between Johannesburg and Casablanca and Johannesburg and Algiers have not

South Africa–North Africa Trade						
Country	EXPORT (R 000)				Rank	
	2004	2003	2002	2001	2004	2003
Morocco	186,244	461,361	1,057,312	812,340	1	1
Algeria	42,935	389,660	560,419	537,693	2	2
Egypt	42,017	269,041	190,819	275,039	3	3
Libya	18,124	40,774	69,308	30,669	4	4
Tunisia	5,751	34,524	34,039	37,668	5	5
Total	295,071	1,195,359	1,911,896	1,693,409	0	0

Country	IMPORT (R 000)				Rank	
	2004	2003	2002	2001	2004	2003
Egypt	26,602	358,021	109,903	72,829	1	1
Morocco	16,713	44,342	57,615	17,988	2	3
Tunisia	4,188	67,850	70,613	43,169	3	2
Algeria	2,084	3,937	4,590	61	4	4
Total	49,587	474,197	242,724	134,047	0	0

Adapted from the South African Department of Trade and Industry

proved to be viable, making travel via Europe or other parts of Africa necessary, which can be costly. The Johannesburg–Cairo air link has survived and remains a cumbersome stopover to other North African capitals.

However, notwithstanding these problems, unless contact between North Africa and the rest of the continent increases, the danger exists that the North African countries will be drawn ever more into the European ambit. This is already happening at an accelerated rate with special market access arrangements being negotiated between the EU and countries of the Mediterranean basin.

In moments of candour, leaders of the region confess to a certain political identity crisis. Are they African, Arab, or Mediterranean? Properly engaged by South Africa in its capacity as the emerging continental power, they will be left in no doubt as to their core identity – being African.²⁰

Endnotes

- 1 Cited in the speech made by President Thabo Mbeki: 'Remarks at the Closing Ceremony of the Second Session of the South Africa-Algeria Binational Commission', Pretoria, 19 October 2001.
- 2 Address to the Congress of the People, Libya, Tripoli, 19 March 1999. See <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1999/nm0319.html>
- 3 The exception is the struggle of the peoples of Western Sahara and Somaliland. For an incisive analysis on why there is a reduced urgency to find a solution to the Morocco–Western Sahara conflict, see Adebajo A, 'Selling out the Sahara? The Tragic Tale of a UN Referendum', *Occasional Paper Series*, Institute for African Development, Cornell University, March 2002. On Somaliland's struggle to free itself from the clutches of Somalia's militia leaders, see Schoiswohl M, *Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of 'Somaliland'. The Resurrection of Somaliland Against All International 'Odds': State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recognition and Human Rights*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004.
- 4 The ANC has offices in Algiers, Cairo, Tripoli and Tunisia and a representative in Casablanca. Today, most of its cadres hold diplomatic positions in the South African foreign service in Qatar, Islamabad etc. For further details, see Thomas S, *The diplomacy of liberation: the foreign relations of the African National Congress since 1960*, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996.
- 5 See 'First International Conference in Solidarity with Peoples under Racial Discrimination', Tripoli, Libya, 23–27 November 1985, organised by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in co-operation with the Guild of Lawyers and the Regional Office of the Organisation of African Lawyers. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/solidarity/conferences/confs.html>. See also the Letter dated 25 March 1960 from the representatives of Libya to the President of the UN Security

- Council requesting consideration of the situation in South Africa. <http://www.anc.org.za/un/undocs.html>
- 6 For further details on this approach, see Jhazbhay I, 'Mandela visit to Libya shows the world that SA is nobody's lapdog', *Sunday Independent*, 25 October 1997. See also the ANC statement issued on Mandela's visit to Libya, 18 October 1997. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1997/pr1018.html>
 - 7 See Mandela's speech, 'Speech at a Banquet Hosted by Colonel Qadhafi, Tripoli', Libya, 22 October 1997. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1997/sp1022.html>
 - 8 Notes for a Speech on Being Awarded the Collar of the Nile by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Cairo, 21 October 1997. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1997/sp1021.html>. See also Mbeki's statement at the Africa-EU Summit, Cairo, 4 April 2000. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2000/tm0404.html>
 - 9 See Mbeki's speech: 'Vote of Thanks at the Closing Session of the 35th Ordinary Session of The OAU Assembly of Head of State and Government', Algeria, 14 July 1999. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1999/tm0714.html> and 'Address at the Opening Session of The South Africa-Algeria Binational Commission', Algiers, 22 September 2000. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2000/tm0922.html>
 - 10 Cited in the speech made by Mbeki at the state banquet for President Bouteflika, Pretoria, 16 October 2001. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2001/tm1016.html>
 - 11 See the ANC website archive which documents ANC relations with Algeria. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1980s/pr881208.html>. Also see 'Brief Profiles of the Men and Women Receiving Their Isitwalandwe Medals on the Occasion of the 80th Anniversary of the ANC in Bloemfontein', 8 January, 1992. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/awards/isitwala_10.html
<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/2001/pr1126c.html>
<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/2001/pr1126c.html>
 See Oliver Tambo's statement 'Algeria Honours Chief Luthuli' *South Africa Freedom News*, Dar es Salaam, November 30, 1964. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1960s/pr641130.html>. See more specifically the role of Bouteflika, 'Ruling by the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria), concerning the credentials of the delegation of South Africa'. Paper presented by the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, Edwin Ogebe Ogbu (Nigeria), to the Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, April 1975. <http://www.anc.org.za/un/undocs2a.html>
 - 12 South Africa's small but vocal Muslim population of some 2% has voiced concern about Algeria's troubled transition to democracy. But the issue has neither topped the agenda of the community nor captured its imagination, in a way that Palestine or Iraq have. For a more detailed sense of the community's feelings, see back issues of the two local Muslim newspapers, *Muslim Views* and *Al-Qalam*, as well as the local radio stations *Radio 786* and *Voice of the Cape*. A key point to recall in understanding Algeria's Islamic political movements is that the radicalisation of Islamic politics was a direct result of the involvement of many *mujahids* in America's battle in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Most returned to Algeria and took up leadership positions and extreme positions on gender and politics. The ANC leadership has closely followed religious and Islamist trends on the continent and has

- developed appropriate policies. It has a full-time Commission for Religious Affairs at its head office and Mbeki meets with religious leaders at least twice a year.
- 13 The settlement of the Western Sahara question remains on the ANC agenda, despite the South African government's formal recognition of the territory. See the resolution of the ANC's 51st National Conference, 2002 where it called on 'the South African government to take special initiatives to advance the process to reach an early settlement'. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/conf/conference51/resolutions.html>
 - 14 A recent report commissioned by the US Congress calls for the US not to normalise relations with Libya until it stops what it says is Libya's support for wars in West Africa. Cited in *Rising. US Stakes in Africa. Seven Proposals to Strengthen US-Africa Policy. A Report of the Africa Advisory Panel, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, May 2004*. During my research in the Horn of Africa, several senior Ethiopian officials complained that Gaddafi's cheque book diplomacy towards Somali militia factions, such as Abdullahi Yusuf and Abdul Qasim Salat, had been counter productive to the region. Somaliland, the peaceful breakaway north western entity, has repeatedly shunned Gaddafi's diplomatic overtures on the basis of principle.
 - 15 Tunisia also played a role in the struggle against apartheid. See for example the Conference of Arab Solidarity with the Struggle for Liberation in Southern Africa, Tunis, 7 August 1984. <http://www.anc.org.za/un/garba.html#g2>
 - 16 See AU press release no 2, 6 December 2003, 'AU Solicits Closer Links between African and Arab Markets'. http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Press_Releases/02%20afro.pdf. The 7th Afro-Arab Trade Fair is scheduled to be held in the United Arab Emirates.
 - 17 See ANC statement on the death of Joe Modise, 26 November 2001. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/2001/pr1126c.html>. See also the statement on Joseph Nduli of 15 August 1995. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1995/pr0815.html>. 'The only African mission to South Africa, the legation of Egypt, was closed on May 31, 1961'. <http://www.anc.org.za/un/sp-com-3.html>
 - 18 See Barber J, *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-99*. Cape Town: David Philip. 2004.
 - 19 Cited in President Mbeki's weekly letter in *ANC Today*, 4, 27, July 2004.
 - 20 For further research, see the following: Cornish J, 'Western Sahara', in Mills G, (Ed) *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1999/2000*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, pp. 357-362; Komegay F, 'Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa: A Stable Balance of Power in Africa', in Mills G & E Sidiropoulos (Eds), *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1999/2000*. op cit, pp. 61-69; Landsberg C, 'Promoting Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine', *Journal of Democracy*, 11, 3, July 2000; Makgohlo S, Jhazbhay I & E Sidiropoulos, 'North Africa: A Review' in Mills G (Ed), *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2000/01*, op. cit., pp. 199-218, Morais K & Naidu S, 'Libya's Africa Policy: What Does It Mean for South Africa and NEPAD?' *South African Journal of International Affairs* 9:109-118, Winter 2002; Sidiropoulos E (ed) *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004: Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004; Sturman K, 'The Role of Libya as a regional player', *African Security Review*, 12, 2, 2003.